Bargaining and Devolution in the Upper Guadiana Basin by Marchiori, Carmen et al.
Masthead Logo Smith ScholarWorks
Economics: Faculty Publications Economics
3-2012
Bargaining and Devolution in the Upper Guadiana
Basin
Carmen Marchiori




University of California - Berkeley
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.smith.edu/eco_facpubs
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article has been accepted for inclusion in Economics: Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Smith ScholarWorks. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@smith.edu
Recommended Citation
Marchiori, Carmen; Sayre, Susan Stratton; and Simon, Leo K., "Bargaining and Devolution in the Upper Guadiana Basin" (2012).
Economics: Faculty Publications, Smith College, Northampton, MA.
https://scholarworks.smith.edu/eco_facpubs/5
Bargaining and Devolution in the Upper
Guadiana Basin
Carmen Marchiori, Susan Stratton Sayre, and Leo K. Simon∗
Abstract
Increasingly, central governments approach contentious natural re-
source allocation problems by devolving partial decision-making re-
sponsibility to local stakeholders. This paper conceptualizes devolu-
tion as a three-stage process and uses a simulation model calibrated to
real-world conditions to analyze devolution in Spain's Upper Guadiana
Basin. The Spanish national government has proposed spending over a
billion euros to reverse a 30 year decline in groundwater levels. We in-
vestigate how the government can most eectively allocate this money
to improve water levels by utilizing its power to set the structure of a
local negotiation process. Using a numerical Nash model of local bar-
gaining, we nd that if the national government creates appropriate
incentives, local bargaining can produce water stabilization. The ac-
tual water levels that will emerge are highly dependent on the central
government's decisions about the budget available to local stakehold-
ers and the default policy, which. will be inuenced by the relative
value the government places on various nancial and environmental
outcomes. Our paper concludes by determining the relationship be-
tween these relative valuations and the government's preferences over
water levels.
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1 Introduction
A common approach to resolving contentious local resource allocation prob-
lems is to empower local stakeholders to develop solutions that are specic
to the local conditions. This approach is often referred to as devolution.
Devolution appeals to central governments for a variety of reasons, including
political philosophy, a belief that local interests better understand the prob-
lem details, and a desire to minimize implementation costs by encouraging
local buy-in. Oates (1972) observed that the benet or cost of decentraliza-
tion relative to central control is largely determined by the degree of regional
heterogeneity. Our interest in this paper is not whether devolution is an
appropriate choice; rather, we note that, for better or worse, many national
governments have chosen devolution to address certain issues. Our interest
is in how the national government can ensure that the resulting outcomes
achieve its goals. Our analysis is thus similar in character to the branch
of the decentralization literature that focuses on developing mechanisms by
which the central government can induce local governments to respect the
national government's goal (see, for example, Levaggi 2002). Much of this
literature focuses on a permanent assignment of responsibility for particular
types of decisions to local governments. In contrast, our interest is in the
one-time devolution of a particular real-world policy choice.
We conceptualize this type of one-time devolution as a three-stage pro-
cess. The rst stage is a structure setting stage in which a central gov-
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ernment sets the structure for local bargaining. For instance, a familiar
pattern in US environmental policy is that the national government sets an
environmental threshold and threatens federally imposed regulations if indi-
vidual states fail to meet the threshold. The threatened regulation provides
a default outcome against which the state political process operates. It also
creates a constraint on the options available at the local level; to avoid the
default outcome, the state policy-making process can only consider policies
that meet the threshold. The second stage is the local bargaining stage
in which local stakeholders select policies within the structure determined
in the previous stage. The last stage is the implementation stage, which
determines how economic agents react to those policy choices. The rst
two stages are political economic problems, while the nal stage is a purely
economic problem. This three-stage framework is used to answer three ques-
tions. First, how does the outcome of the local bargaining process depend
on the decisions made at the national level? Second, given that variation,
what structure should the national government set in the rst stage? Finally,
what policy outcomes will result given the government's choices?
This paper applies our three-stage devolution framework to a groundwa-
ter allocation problem in Spain's Upper Guadiana Basin. Negotiations over
groundwater issues have been studied in a variety of contexts. Netanyahu
et al. (1998) apply both cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining models
to groundwater allocation between Israel and Palestine. Just and Netanyahu
(1998) investigate the divergence between ideal basin-wide management of
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multi-national river basins and the real world experience of bi-lateral agree-
ments within these basins. A common theme of these papers is that the
potential for free-riding and cheating may reduce the eciency of nal out-
comes.
The setting we model diers from these papers in two key respects. First,
our model considers a basin that lies entirely within one jurisdiction. We
therefore model individual water users rather than aggregated states. As a
result, we take free-riding behavior as given; farmers in our model respond
optimally ex-post to whatever policies are imposed. Second, a major focus
of our paper is the role of the national government in setting the conditions
under which local negotiation occurs.
Over the last 30 years, the Upper Guadiana Basin has experienced large
declines in groundwater levels. In recent years, the Spanish national govern-
ment has indicated a willingness to appropriate signicant funds to improve
conditions in the Guadiana. It has also explicitly sought to involve local
stakeholders in the process, seeking a compromise solution and ceding con-
siderable control over the plan details to local entities. Yet, the local policy
process has stalled and failed to produce a viable plan for improving water
levels within the region.1 We believe that this failure stems from the national
government's failure to establish explicit consequences for local stakeholders
failing to achieve compromise. By failing to do so, the national government
1In 2008, a plan was adopted. This plan is in the early stages of implementation and
it remains to be seen whether it can ultimately be successful in stabilizing or improving
water levels.
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has established an implicit default  the continuation of current policies in-
denitely. If the national government truly wishes to improve water levels, it
must use both its budgetary powers and its power to set the default to meet
its goals.
Water right enforcement is a central feature of the Guadiana problem.
Although groundwater use in the region is legally allowed only with the pos-
session of water rights, illegal use is rampant. Illegal use is facilitated by both
the local political opposition to enforcement and the lack of infrastructure
for monitoring water use. As a result, the Guadiana problem must be viewed
through the lens of enforcement policy. There is a strong sense that eective
enforcement is only feasible if local interests accept the rules regarding water
use and that this acceptance is unlikely unless local interests feel that they
were part of the plan development. This paper does not investigate whether
local input is truly necessary. Instead, it demonstrates one way that the gov-
ernment might induce stakeholders to agree to a stringent enforcement policy.
The approach draws on ideas developed in the voluntary compliance litera-
ture (Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Segerson and Wu, 2006). The basic lesson
of this literature is that under certain circumstances, a government can con-
vince rms to voluntarily comply with a goal by threatening an undesirable
alternate policy. In the Guadiana setting, it is infeasible to induce voluntary
compliance because of free-riding concerns. Instead, we demonstrate that
with appropriate incentives, the national government can use the threat of
a relatively mild ne policy to induce stakeholders to impose a much more
5
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stringent ne policy upon themselves as part of a local compromise solution.
Since it is dicult to precisely identify the national government's goal,
we examine a stylized specication of choices facing the national government,
focusing on the national government's tradeo between the environment,
farm prot, and the burden on taxpayers. We consider various possible levels
for the government's willingness to trade between these objectives; for each
level, we identify the government's optimal policy choices and the resulting
outcomes.
In the next section, we describe the details of the Guadiana problem.
We then develop a stylized model capturing the essential features of the
problem. We describe the main results produced by this model and then
oer concluding comments.
2 The Guadiana Basin
The Upper Guadiana Basin lies in the Castilla-La Mancha region of Spain.
The area is heavily agricultural and relies on groundwater for most of its
water needs. Over the last 30 years, groundwater has fueled signicant eco-
nomic growth in the region, but has also caused dramatic declines in water
levels within the region. The declines have nearly destroyed the wetlands in
Las Tablas de Daimiel national park, along with much of the other remaining
wetlands in the region. Moreover, declining water levels have caused many
existing wells to dry up. A number of authors and studies have described
6
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the history, economics, and social conditions within the Upper Guadiana (see
Rosell (2001),(Llamas and Martinez-Santos, 2005)). An approximate rela-
tionship between depth and use derived from (Bromley et al., 1996, 2001)
suggests that if farmers continued current use indenitely, water levels would
fall from 50 m below surface today to 116 m below the surface in 30 years. A
series of policy initiatives over the last 20 years have aimed to improve water
levels, but have been unsuccessful at generating sustained reductions in use
thus far.
There is a substantial literature on the economics of groundwater use.
Economists have long argued that groundwater will be overexploited in the
absence of coordinated management, since it is a common property resource.
Early economic work on groundwater focused on determining the socially
optimal groundwater extraction path and proposing regulatory instruments
capable of achieving this optimum.2 In 1980, Gisser and Sanchez demon-
strated that the benets of groundwater management can be small in prac-
tice. Koundouri (2004) presents a detailed survey of the economic literature
on groundwater, including an extended discussion of papers that have inves-
tigated the robustness of the Gisser-Sanchez nding.
Three lessons from the groundwater literature are important for the Gua-
diana context. First, as pumping costs rise due to lower water tables, farmers
will reduce their pumping activity. This feedback eect limits reductions in
2See, for example, Burt (1964, 1966, 1967, 1970); Bredehoeft and Young (1970); Brown
and Deacon (1972); Gisser and Mercado (1973b,a); Brown (1974)
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groundwater levels. Under the current common property regime, our eco-
nomic model (described in the implementation section below) predicts that
this feedback is likely to be mild; we project that farmers will cut back their
water use from 677 Mm3 per year today to an average annual extraction
of 660 Mm3, a reduction of barely 2.5%. Second, due to the pumping cost
externality, farmers would collectively be willing to limit their use if barriers
to collective action could be overcome. Our model suggests that if cost-
less collective action were possible, farmers would reduce water use further
to approximately 570 Mm3, a reduction of approximately 15% from current
levels. Finally, the Gisser-Sanchez results imply that the benets of reducing
the pumping externality are small, suggesting that overcoming the barriers
to collective action is likely only if there are other externalities that whose
resolution is also valued by the policy making process. In the Guadiana con-
text, the second externality is the environmental impact on the wetlands.
In the Guadiana basin, our simulations suggest that eliminating the pump-
ing cost externality would increase farming prots by approximately 3% (see
subsection 4.1), a value in line with many of the estimates in the literature.
A signicant feature of the Guadiana problem is the importance of ille-
gal water use. Legal use within the region is approximately 370 Mm3, well
below the estimated sustainable yield of 430 Mm3 (Bromley et al., 1996,
2001). However, approximately 45% of all estimated water use is illegal.3
3All gures for illegal water use, and therefore for total water use, are estimates. See
Appendix A.
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Achieving reductions in water use therefore requires addressing the illegal
use problem. There are two major impediments to reducing illegal use: in-
sucient infrastructure and political opposition. As shown in Section 4, with
current monitoring technology, an enforcement regime capable of stabilizing
water levels would be prohibitively expensive. An important component of
proposed reforms for the region involves an investment in monitoring tech-
nology. In particular, attention is focused on installing meters on existing
wells. Particularly for farmers with illegal wells, there is no incentive to in-
stall a meter unless the government provides a reward in return. Political
opposition creates a second obstacle to eective enforcement. For historical
reasons, the current distribution of water rights is widely viewed as unfair,
fueling public outcry against attempts at enforcing water rights. Since one
of the legal entities charged with enforcing rights is the local Water User
Group, made up of farmers themselves, public opposition has thus far been
sucient to prevent enforcement.
The result is that addressing the concerns in the Guadiana basin requires
both reorganizing and enforcing water rights. Following current discussions in
the region, we model the reorganization of water rights through a combined
program of purchasing some existing water rights and legalizing a portion
of the water use on farms that currently lack any water rights. The key
policy variables in the reorganization program are the budget available for
acquisition of rights and the share of water use on farms without rights that
will be legalized. The key policy variables in the enforcement program are
9
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the severity of nes and the funds made available for enforcement activities.
Given the prevalence of illegal use within the region today, it is critical
that the two programs be coupled. Without enforcement, the purchase of ex-
isting water rights will not necessarily lead to actual reductions in water use;
it may simply transform legal use into illegal use. To reinforce this coupling
and to minimize enforcement expenditures, we assume that the government
will link participation in either portion of the water right reorganization pro-
gram with an agreement to install a meter.
Our model structure assumes that responsibility for setting these poli-
cies will be divided between the national government and a local negotiation
process. We believe that the split described below is indicative of both polit-
ical realities in the region and the decisions the national government appears
willing to cede to stakeholders in the region. At the same time, we do not
intend to imply that the national government is necessarily constrained by
the split. If it had the political will to do so over the strenuous objections
of citizens within the region, there is nothing that explicitly prevents the na-
tional government from directly setting all the policies. In the next section,
we develop a stylized model of all three layers of decision making. Our model
is designed to capture the key components of the debate at a high level. We
thus focus exclusively on water use, abstracting away from quality issues.
10
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3 The Model
In the rst stage of our model, called the structure setting stage, the
national government makes decisions that inuence the structure of local
bargaining. The decisions are represented by the vector z. Once the bar-
gaining structure is set, local stakeholders select the value of various policy
instruments in the local bargaining stage. The policy choices are given
by the vector b. Finally, regional farmers respond to the policy instruments
in the implementation stage. The choices of an individual farm are given
by the vector xi; together these choices determine the value of an imple-
mentation vector y, which includes both the farm choices and several other
endogenous variables. Table 1 lists each of the variables that are endogenous
to our model.
Our model includes four policy instruments, denoted by vector g: the
severity of nes for illegal water use (φ), the budget for monitoring water
use (BM), the budget for purchasing water rights from farmers (BA) and the
partial legalization of water rights on farms that currently lack any rights
(λ). Responsibility for setting these instruments is divided between the na-
tional government and a local stakeholder negotiation process. Moreover,
our model implicitly includes two policy vectors: one g0 is imposed if the
stakeholders fail to reach agreement and the other gN is the outcome of the
bargaining process. In the structure setting stage, the national government
makes decisions about how much to spend on enforcement and acquisition,
11
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Table 1: Endogenous Variables
Variable Description
g = (BM , BA, φ, λ) Policies selected during the rst two stages
BM Annualized budget for enforcing water rights
BA Annualized budget for acquiring water rights
φ Fine coecient describin severity of penalties
λ Legalized share of use on farms with no rights today
z = (zM , zA, zφ) Policies selected during the structure-settting stage
zM BM available to stakeholders in negotiation stage
zA BA available to stakeholders in negotiation stage
zφ Fine coecient imposed if bargaining fails
b = (bφ, bλ) Policies selected during the local bargaining stage
bφ Fine cocient (φ) set during local bargaining
bλ Legalized share (λ) set during local bargaining
xi = (Li,W
S
i , σi) Choices made by farm i
Li Vector of land planted in each crop for farm i
WSi Water rights sold by farm i
σi Binary choice of whether farm i installs a meter
y = (L,WS, H, ρ, pW )) All endogenous variables determined during implementation stage
L Vector of land use by crop for all farms
WS Vector of water sales for all farms
H Depth from ground surface to water level
ρ Vector of probabilities that illegal use on each farm is detected
pW Price at which water rights are purchased
12
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as well as the severity of its threat to the local stakeholders. None of these
policies is appropriate for inclusion in the local negotiation stage; national
expenditures must be determined by the national government and only the
national government can impose an enforcement policy outside of the local
process. In the local stakeholder negotiation, we focus on two policies: the
severity of negotiated illegal use sanctions and the negotiated portion of wa-
ter use on farms that currently lack any rights should be legalized. The water
acquisition and legalization policies are used as carrots to induce farmers
to accept more stringent nes and agree to install water meters. As a result,
farmers are only oered the opportunity to sell rights or receive a legalized
share if they agree to install a meter.
Once the national government and local stakeholders have nalized ne-
gotiations, individual farmers must respond to the policies that have been
agreed upon. Farmers thus play two roles in our model: in addition to par-
ticipating in the local negotiation process, we require that they respond to
the outcome of these negotiations in ways that are in accordance with their
individual economic self-interests. Individuals farmers in our model choose
how much acreage to plant in a variety of crops, how much water to sell, and
whether to install a meter. Together, these choices also determine water use
(and therefore water levels), the eectiveness of a given monitoring budget,
and the price at which water rights are purchased.
In the remainder of this section, we describe the details of each stage
of the model. Since the model must be solved using backwards induction,
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we describe the details of the stages in reverse order, beginning with the
implementation stage, moving to the local negotiation stage, and nishing
with the structure setting stage.
3.1 Implementation Stage
The rst step in determining the impact of a policy vector g is determining
the response of individual farmers. Individual farms within the model are
indexed by i. We divide the farms into four types (small farms without water
rights, small farms with water rights, medium farms and large farms) and let
τi be the type for farmer i.
4 These types reect the major divisions between
farm types described in Appendix A.2. Each farmer chooses a vector of
land allocated to each crop (Li), whether to install a meter (σi), and how







. We assume that a xed quantity of water is applied to a
hectare of land for a given crop. The choice about how much water to use
for farming thus follows directly from the choice of land allocation.
Our model of farm optimization is necessarily schematic; we assume that
farmers plant the most protable crop and abstract away other factors that
might inuence crop choice. Moreover, our model is static; we choose one
crop allocation for the entire period. We are thus implicitly selecting long-run
crop choice and therefore do not model costs of switching crops. The model
may therefore overestimate farmers willingness to switch crops, particularly
4There are no medium or large farms in the region without water rights.
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in the short run.




(pcϑc − ζcLic − ξc)Lic + pWW Si (1)
where c indexes crops, pc is the market price, ϑc is the yield per hectare, Lic
is the hectares of land devoted to crop c , ζc and ξc are production function
parameters, and pW is the price at which water rights are purchased from
farmers, determined endogenously by a budget balance condition. The rst
term is the revenue from selling crops and the second is the revenue from
selling water rights.
Farm costs have three components: the cost of pumping water (CW ),
meter installation costs (CM) and expected nes for illegal use (CF ). The
cost of pumping water is given by
CW (xi) = eHw
d · Li
where wd is a vector of irrigation doses per hectare for dierent crops, e is the
energy cost per meter of pumping lift, and H is the pumping lift in meters.
Meter installation cost are
CM (xi) = mσi
where m is the cost of a meter.
15
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics. 
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5
Expected nes for illegal water use are given by






where ρi is the probability of detection, φ is the coecient describing the
severity of sanctions, Ψ (·) is illegal water use, and γ determines how rapidly
per unit nes increase with illegal water use.,Illegal water use is a residual
amount given by
Ψ (xi) = max
{
wd · Li +W Si −WRi , 0
}
(2)
whereWRi (λ) denotes the farmer's water rights before water sales as function
of the legalization policy determined in the bargaining stage. For the three
types with water rights, WRi is independent of the bargaining; for the nal
type (small farms without rights), their endogenous water rights are given
by
WRi (λ) = λσiW
0
i (3)
where W 0i gives the farm's current water use. Since σi = 0 unless a farmer
has installed a meter, farms without rights today will not get a legalized
share unless they install a meter.
We assume that γ > 1, implying that the per unit ne rate increases
as illegal water use increases. This approach is motivated by two factors.
First, farmers' behavior must respond smoothly to changes in ne policy
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to use standard optimization techniques, which is guaranteed by this form.
Second, farmers in the region have expressed a preference for an increasing
ne structure (Lopez-Gunn, 2003, pp. 243-244). The coecient gives the
ne paid by a farmer caught using one unit of water illegally.
Of course, farmers only pay a ne if they are caught using water illegally.
Monitoring farmers is costly and the budget for enforcement is set by the
national government. The cost of monitoring an individual farmer depends
on the current monitoring technology.5 As more farmers install meters on
their wells, a given expenditure on monitoring leads to higher detection rates.
As a result, the probability of catching illegal users is endogenous to the farm
production problem. The probability that an individual farmer is caught if




· (σiωm + (1 − σi)ωnm) (4)
where Nm is the number of farms with meters, νm is the cost of monitoring
a farm with a meter, Nnm and νnm are the equivalent for a farm without
a meter, and ωm and ωnm are the probabilities that illegal use is detected
if monitoring occurs for farms with and without meters, respectively.6 The
revenues from nes are returned to the taxpayers as described in subsection
5Today, monitoring in the Guadiana basin can be done by remote sensing (which is
problematic for small farms), by validating production plans, by physically visiting farms,
or by monitoring electricity usage. Discussions in the region about improving monitoring
are highly focused on the installation of meters rather than expanding other approaches.
6We do not vary the allocation of monitoring eort between farms with and without
meters. This policy choice would be interesting to investigate in future work.
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3.3.
Farmers have diminishing marginal utility, giving an optimization prob-
lem of
maxxiF (xi) = [R (xi) − CW (xi) − CM (xi) − CF (xi)]
η (5)
for some η < 1, subject to
W Si ≤ WRi · σi (6)∑
c
Lic ≤ L̄i (7)
where L̄i is the total land available to the farmer. The rst constraint states
that farmers cannot sell more water rights than they currently have and
cannot sell any water rights unless a meter is installed. The second constraint
states that a farmer cannot plant more land than he has.
The collective impact of farmers must be determined by jointly solving







To do so, we compute the rst-order conditions for a representative farmer
from each type.7 The full solution to the implementation stage jointly solves
7See the appendix for a description of the optimization technique used to address the
discrete choice of whether or not to install a meter.
18
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics. 
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5
the farmers' rst-order conditions for each farm's choices (xi), its detection
probability (ρi), pumping lift (H), and the price of water (pW ) given the
policy vector (g). There is no closed-form solution to this system of non-
linear inequalities; its solution is denoted y∗ (g).
Three specic outcomes of the implementation stage play an important
role in the two policy-setting stages. The resulting water level is given by






where H0 is a baseline from which pump lifts are calculated and H (·) is
a function relating total water use to pumping depth. Moreover, the total




[R (xi) − C (xi)] (10)











3.2 Local Bargaining Stage
Today, water policy decisions in the Guadiana Basin are being made through
a stakeholder negotiation process. In our model, this process is responsible
for setting two components of g: the negotiated ne (bφ) and the negotiated
19
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legalized share (bλ). Even in the negotiated solution, the remaining two
components of g are set by the national government. The bargained policy
vector gN is thus given by
gN (b, z) = (zM , zA, bφ, bλ) . (12)
Based on our review of the policy discussions, we identify ve major stake-
holder groups: environmentalists, and four types of farmers, distinguished
by size and water rights. Each of the groups is represented at the local bar-
gaining table by a single player. These players are indexed by j. For the four
farm groups, j = t and the player's utility functions is given by
Uj (gN (b, z)) = πj (y
∗ (gN))
δj (13)
where δj is the level of risk aversion for the stakeholder group representing
that farm type. The environmental stakeholder group is represented by a
player with the utility function
Uj (gN (b, z)) = W
L (y∗ (gN))
δj . (14)
The outcome of the local stakeholder negotiated process is highly inu-
enced by the stakeholders beliefs about what they believe will happen if they
fail to reach agreement, i.e. by the vector g0. We assume that national gov-
ernment makes a three-pronged threat to the local stakeholders: refusing to
20
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legalize any water use, imposing a penalty for illegal use, and using all its
allocated funds for monitoring. This implies that
g0 = (zM + zA, 0, zφ ,0) . (15)
The bargaining process is modeled using the bargaining solution developed
by Nash (1950) extended to multiple players (Lensberg, 1988). In our setting,




[Uj (gN (b, z)) − Uj (g0 (z))]
1
J .
where j indexes the stakeholder groups. The solution to this problem is
found using numerical techniques and is given b∗ (z). Similarly, we call the
resulting negotiated policy g∗N (z).
3.3 Structure Setting Stage
We assume that the national government seeks to balance three objectives:
(1) maximizing total farm prots, (2) improving water levels, and (3) mini-
mizing government expenditures. Total farm prots are
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and the total government expenditure is
TC (z) = NPV [zM + zA − ϕ (y∗ (g∗N (z)))] . (17)
This yields a government objective function of:
Ω (z) = Π (z) + αeW
L (y∗ (g∗N (z))) − TC (z) − αtTC (z) (18)
where αe gives the marginal value the government places on water level im-
provements and αt is a coecient governing the deadweight loss of taxation.
Specically, αe is the government's marginal willingness to trade reductions
in annual farming prots for increases in water levels, measured in C= /m .
Its value is inuenced by both the political power of environmental lobbies
and individuals' willingness to pay for water level improvements. Absent
contingent valuation studies for the Guadiana problem, we have no basis for
selecting a particular value of αe. Accordingly, we consider a range of values
from 0 to 100 million euros. We vary the value of αt from 0 to 0.1.
If there were a closed form representation of y∗ (g∗N (z)), maximizing Eq.
(18) would be straightforward. Instead, generating each point in the map-
ping requires solving the numerical model. Solving this model for a single
combination can take several hours. It is thus impractical to attempt a direct
solution of the government's optimization problem using the full numerical
model. To surmount this diculty and save computation time, we solve the
full model for a grid of possible values of z. Our results presented in sub-
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section 4.4 were generated by selecting the point in this grid that yielded
the highest value of Ω rather than the optimizing over the full model. The
results should therefore be interpreted as providing a rough estimate of the
policy choice that would be selected by the government.
4 Results
We use the numerical model developed in Section 3 to produce four types
of results. First, we compute the land use choices that would maximize an
equally weighted utilitarian social welfare function by allowing a benevolent
dictator to directly select land use for each farm type. Since land use choices
implicitly determine water use, this corresponds to allowing the benevolent
dictator to set water use. We compute these estimates for several dierent
marginal values of water level improvements. These computations provide an
estimate of the ecient level of water use. Second, we explore the prospects
for improving water levels using enforcement policy alone. Third, we use
the bargaining model to assess whether the carrot-stick framework described
in Section 3.1 can induce signicant improvements in water levels. Finally,
we combine the full three-stage model to address the national government's
choices in the structure setting stage.
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4.1 Ecient Water Levels
The two panels in Figure 1 illustrate the impact of eliminating both the
pumping and environmental externalities related to water use. The size of
the environmental externality is dependent on the monetary value of the
wetlands. We have considered a range of possible monetary values for the
wetlands from 0 to 100 million C= per meter. Each point in the diagrams
represents the internalization of both externalities for a specic value placed
on the wetlands. The points are found by setting all the policy instruments




π (xi) + αeW
L (xi)
for various values of αe.
When αe = 0, the impact on the wetlands has no cost to society and the
only externality is the pumping cost externality. This calculation corresponds
to maximizing farm prots and thus illustrates the impact of eliminating the
pumping cost externality alone. Elimination of the pumping cost externality
would reduce pumping lifts by approximately 30m and increase farm prots
by just over 8 million C= per year, an increase of just under 3%. As the value
on the wetlands increases, the monetary size of the damages imposed by
the environmental externality increases. At the extreme right, the marginal
value of environmental water level improvements is set at a net present value
of 100 million euros of farm prots per meter of water level improvement
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Figure 1: Utilitarian Social Welfare Maximizing Outcomes




























































(equivalent to roughly 3 million C= in annual farm prots). In each diagram,
the consistently dashed line shows the projected outcome under the current
common property regime, assuming no policy changes occur. Finally, the line
with alternating dashes and dots in the middle of the water depth diagram
illustrates the current water depth. This diagram suggests that if costless
enforcement were possible, the utilitarian social welfare maximizing policy
would be consistent with water level stabilization if the marginal value of
water level improvements just under 40 million C= per meter of improvement.
4.2 Enforcement Policy Alone
Since individual farmers will always have an incentive to free-ride, the rst-
best outcomes in Figure 1 are unattainable. Some enforcement mechanism
must be used to induce farmers to reduce water levels. Figure 2 shows the
resulting water depths for dierent combinations of the ne coecient (φ)
and monitoring expenditures (BM). The value of the ne coecient gives
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Figure 2: Water Depths Resulting from Unilateral Enforcement Policy (m)





































the ne that would be paid by a farmer caught using 1000 cubic meters (m3)
of water illegally.8 The labels on each contour give the depth to groundwater
in meters. The results are consistent with expectations: water depths fall
(that is, water levels rise) as either the ne coecient or the monitoring
expenditure increases. At the extreme left, when nes are zero, the size of
the monitoring budget has no impact  water depths remain at the common
property level of approximately 116m. Fines are quite eective at reducing
pumping depths small amounts, but improvements in water depths need
increasingly high nes as depths fall.
Under the special plan for the Guadiana basin, the Spanish government
has indicated a willingness to spend approximately 1 billion C= to address
the region's water problems. Our model predicts that with this budget, the
government would have to set the ne coecient at around 300 C= to stabilize
8Note that according to the ne structure specied in Section 3, the ne coecient is
measured in units of C= per ( thousand m3)γ . For simplicity, we simply refer to C= .
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water levels at current depths using enforcement policy alone.
The results suggest that it would be possible to reduce water use through
enforcement policy alone. Yet, this approach will disproportionally impact
small farmers without rights. From an implementation perspective, this is
potentially problematic in that it is likely to give rise to political opposition.
Indeed, such political opposition has been at the heart of the failures of
government eorts to address the Guadiana problems in the past.
4.3 Bargaining Solution
In this subsection, we focus on the second stage of the model, taking outcomes
of the rst stage as given. First, we describe the bargaining outcome for a
given default policy in detail. We then vary the level of the default ne
coecient (zφ) and assess how this inuences the bargaining. In this section,
we freeze the monitoring and acquisition budgets at net present values of
100 million and 900 million C= , respectively. These numbers were chosen to
be representative of current plans to spend over 1 billion C= with the vast
majority targeted for a water rights acquisition plan.
We use a default ne coecient of 100 C= for the base simulations. Bar-
gaining against this default, stakeholders agree upon a ne coecient of
roughly 6000 C= and a legalized share of approximately 43% of existing use
on farms without rights. This negotiated ne coecient corresponds to an
average ne per thousand m3 of 1750 C= for the farms caught using illegal wa-
ter. This is a high ne, particularly in relation to current pumping costs of 70
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C= /thousandm3 and farming prots of approximately 1200 C= per thousand
m3 of water use. In other words, with this ne level, illegal water costs over
25 times as much as legal water if the illegal use is detected. Yet only a small
number of farms get caught using water illegally, so the average expected ne
is only 172 C= /thousand m3. This implies that the expected cost of illegal
water is nearly three and a half times the expected cost of legal water. As we
would expect, these high nes are eective at deterring illegal water use; no
farm group averages more than 0.45 thousand m3 of illegal water per farm in
the equilibrium. What is striking about these high nes is that farmer groups
agree to impose these nes upon themselves in exchange for the government's
carrots: diverting a signicant portion of its budget away from enforcement
toward acquiring water rights and allowing stakeholders to reallocate some
of those rights to farms without water rights today. This result is discussed
in more detail below.
In this base scenario, the government purchases 100 Mm3 of water rights
and grants approximately 115 Mm3 of new rights, increasing the amount
of legal water use approximately 15 Mm3. Yet the dramatic increase in
enforcement means that total water use falls from 680 Mm3 to just under
400 Mm3.As a result, water levels recover nearly 8 m from current levels. In
contrast, if the default ne coecient of 100 C= were imposed in isolation,
water levels would fall just over 20 m from their current level. Negotiation
thus increases the water level roughly 30 m relative to the default policy.
Moreover, the resulting water levels are nearly 70 m higher than the projected
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Water Depth as a Function of Default Enforcement






















level resulting from continuing current policies.
To assess the sensitivity of this result with respect to zφ, we solved the
local negotiation stage under a variety of default ne specications. Figure
3 shows the impact of these ne scenarios. As expected, the nal water
depth decreases (and water level rises) as zφ rises. A default ne coecient
of approximately 50 C= is suciently high to stabilize water levels given the
currently announced budget. This default induces a bargaining solution with
a nal ne coecient of approximately 6000 C= and legalization of roughly
60% of the usage on farms without rights today. For comparison purposes,
we have included a second line showing the water depths resulting from
enforcement policy alone.9
9This line traces the value of water depths along the horizontal line located at 1 billion
C= in Figure 2.
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As in our base case example, local stakeholders choose a very stringent
ne policy in each of these solutions. Through the negotiation, farmers agree
to impose upon themselves enforcement regimes that have been seen as in-
feasible in the region thus far. They do this because the incentives oered by
the national government in the form of legalized water rights and water right
purchases outweigh the costs of having their water use eectively regulated.
It is critical to the success of the policy that farmers are indeed willing to
impose a larger ne coecient through negotiation than the national govern-
ment threatens.
To understand this result, recall that the objective in the Nash bargaining
model is to maximize the product of players' gains relative to the default over
the set of Pareto improvements on the default. The maximum will clearly
occur at a point where all players experience a gain (assuming such a point
exists). Therefore, a bargaining solution requires increased prots for every
farm group and lower water use to increase the payo of environmentalists.
The only way to increase the payo of environmentalists is to ensure that
water levels are higher in the bargained solution than in the default. The
only way to substantially improve the payo of farmers without rights is to
oer them a legalized share. Yet, doing so increases their incentive to use
water since these farmers now pay nes on a smaller portion of their use.
Unless the stakeholders can generate enough water use savings from farms
with rights, they must increase enforcement to consider a positive legalized
share in the solution.
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The acquisition process increases the payos of farmers by oering them
payments for a portion of their water rights. In principle, this lowers water
use by inducing farmers to switch production from high water use crops to
low water use crops. However, unless there is eective enforcement, farmers
may sell their water rights but continue to use most of the water they sold.
Their legal use will go down, but illegal use will increase leaving little change
in overall use. Therefore, without eective enforcement, there may not be
funds to purchase enough rights to generate signicant decreases in water
use.
Fortunately, the model predicts that the incentives oered are sucient
to induce farmers to accept more stringent enforcement than the default
policy.10 There are two important drivers of this result. First, the monitoring
cost saving achieved by a combination of meter installation and high nes
allow a large nancial transfer to farmers with rights in the form of water right
purchases. Second, the water savings from the acquisition allow granting
small farms considerable rights to use water while still reducing overall water
use. As a result, all parties gain relative to the default. However, it is
important to realize that at the currently announced budgets, signicant
water levels improvements will not occur unless the central government can
credibly threaten to impose a default ne unilaterally should stakeholders
fail to reach agreement.
10Note that this is a general result of the model. For any default enforcement policy,
the stakeholders will agree to a more stringent policy in the negotiated solution.
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4.4 Structure Setting
Our nal set of results illustrates how the government might set policies in
the structure setting stage. As discussed in subsection 3.3, it is not feasible
to optimize Eq. 18 using the numerical simulation model. Instead, we solved
the local bargaining model for various values of z.11 We then computed the
value of Ω (z) assuming various values for αe (the marginal value of water level
improvements) and αt (a parameter describing how quickly the deadweight
loss of taxation increases). Finally, we selected the point in our grid of z
values that yielded the highest value of Ω. Regardless of the value of αe or αt,
the highest values of Ω were always associated with the lowest non-zero value
of zM included in our policy grid. This result is not surprising; it is consistent
with the general observation that the most cost eective monitoring regimes
set extremely high nes and engage in very little monitoring. It is important
to note, however, that the policies in which zM = 0 were never associated
with the highest value of Ω.
Figure 4 shows the selected values of zφ and zA as a function of αe.
12
When αe = 0, the national government cares only about farming prot and
government expenditures. When αe = 75 at the extreme right, the national
11Our policy grid analysis had two steps. First, we varied zφ from 10 to 100, total
expenditure (zM + zA) from 0.7 to 1.5 billion C= , and the share spent on acquisition from
0.8 to 0.94. Based on the results in this hypercube, we then analyzed a grid of policies in
which we froze zM at 1.25 million C= per year (roughly 43 million in NPV) and varied zφ
from 0 to 100 C= and zA from 0.5 to 1.5 billion C= . Finally, we included the outcome of
continued common property access to groundwater in our set of options available to the
government.
12In all cases, zM was set equal to 2 million C= per year, which corresponds to a net
present value of 42 million C= .
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Figure 4: Policy Choices for Various Political Weights




























































government is willing to spend 75 million C= in net present value per meter
of water level improvement. In the diagram, we set the value of αt at 0.1.
Increasing or decreasing the value of αt has the expected impact (increases
will lead to smaller expenditures and higher depths while decreases lead to
larger expenditures and smaller depths.
When the environmental value of water level improvements is low, the
government will spend very little money and not threaten nes. The specic
budget of 500 million C= identied in the diagram for the very lowest values
of αe was the smallest budget in our grid. The government might well reduce
the budget below this amount, but it will choose some action over inaction
due to the pumping cost externality. This is apparent because the identied
policy was chosen over doing nothing.
As the environmental value of water level improvements increases, both
acquisition budgets and default ne coecients increase. Figure 5 graphs the
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Figure 5: Water Depth Associated with αe



























resulting water depths in a similar plot. The dashed line in the water depth
diagram is the line from 1 showing the utilitarian social welfare maximizing
outcome with costless enforcement and the same marginal value of water
level improvements. At the extreme left of the plot, the devolution process
described in this paper will reduce water levels more than the rst-best,
despite the cost of enforcement. This result is driven by the presence of
an environmental stakeholder insisting on water level improvements in the
local negotiation. Although granting power to the local process means that
water use may be cut too much, this result is still preferred by the national
government to continuing to allow unrestricted common property access to
the groundwater. As the weight on water level improvements increases, the
corresponding depths fall. A marginal value of roughly 45 million euros per
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meter of water level improvements would lead the government to adopt a
policy that could be expected to induce water level stabilization.
5 Concluding Remarks
The numerical simulations in this paper generate several conclusions. First,
our analysis of enforcement policy conrms that it is unlikely that enforce-
ment policy alone can successfully solve the Guadiana problem. Simulations
suggest that even with extremely high penalties for those caught using ille-
gal water, the government would still be required to spend a prohibitively
large sum on monitoring in order to stabilize water levels at the current lev-
els. Moreover, this policy would place all of the burden of water reduction
on farms that have no legal rights. These farms are predominantly small,
family-owned operations and policy-makers are reluctant to destroy their
protability. Moreover, there is no evidence that the national government
has the political will to unilaterally impose an unpopular enforcement policy
over the strong objections of those within the region.
Successful water use reduction requires coupling enforcement policy with
a water rights reorganization program. If farmers agree to install meters and
accept higher nes, the cost of an eective enforcement regime can be sub-
stantially reduced. Two possible incentives to promote meter installation are
the opportunity to sell water rights and a partial legalization of current use.
Our simulations indicate that if the national government combines sucient
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funding for these incentives with suciently strong threats if agreement is
not reached, then a local stakeholder bargaining process can stabilize water
levels or even reverse the current declining trend in water levels. For in-
stance, using a total budget of 1 billion C= , the national government would
be required to use a ne coecient of well over 300 C= to stabilize water
levels if it used enforcement policy alone. In contrast, by threatening a ne
coecient of merely 50 C= , the government can induce a bargaining solution
that stabilizes water levels for the same overall budget. The incentives are
sucient to induce farmers to install meters and to accept increased nes.
As a result, substantial monitoring savings are achieved. The savings can
then be used to fund the incentive programs.
Many of the basic features of the model analyzed in this paper, including
the conict between agricultural and environmental uses and the problem
of enforcement, are common to many environmental problems. Increasingly,
devolution is being adopted as the policy of choice for addressing many such
conicts. Our analysis highlights the important connections between choices
about the structure of devolution and the ultimate bargaining outcomes.
In the Guadiana example, decisions made at the national level determine
whether the local stakeholder process can be eective. If the national gov-
ernment fails to establish a strong credible threat, the local bargaining will
produce minimal gains in water levels, if any. In contrast, with appropriate
incentives, the local stakeholders can achieve substantial improvements in
water levels. Moreover, these results demonstrate that by oering incentives,
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a national government can induce local stakeholders to adopt an eective
enforcement regime themselves. This level of involvement may foster local
buy-in and reduce political opposition to enforcement.
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A Appendix
This appendix provides additional details on several elements of the model.
A.1 Implementation Stage Computations
Subsection 3.1 describes the equations that implicitly dene y∗ (g). Solving
this system numerically presents a number of challenges. In this section, we
describe our solution method, beginning with the rst-order conditions for
individual farms.
The rst-order conditions for land use and water sales are found by sim-
ply taking derivatives. However, the decision to install a meter is a binary
choice, so calculus techniques are inapplicable. Accordingly, we use calculus
to solve two problems, one assuming no meter installation (σi = 0) and one
assuming a meter is installed (σi = 1). The optimized payo in the two cases
is written F ∗i (0) and F
∗
i (1). Pure prot maximization dictates that farmers
should install meters whenever F ∗i (0) exceeds F
∗
i (1). If farmers behaved this
way, however, our model would be discontinuous whenever F ∗i (0) = F
∗
i (1).
To preserve continuity we smooth out the installation choice by assum-
ing that dierent farmers incur dierent non-pecuniary net benets from
installing meters. Specically, we assume that the non-pecuniary utility gain
from installing a meter is a random variable denoted by θ. θ is distributed
throughout the population according to a cumulative distribution function
given by K (θ). We assume this distribution is constant for all farm types.
A farmer installs a meter if θi > F
∗
i (0) − F ∗i (1). Since all farms of the same
type are identical except for θi, the fraction of farms of type t installing a
meter is given by K(F ∗i|τi=t (0) − F
∗
i|τi=t (1)). Clearly, this fraction increases
as the dierence F ∗i (0)−F ∗i (1) decreases. The variable θ can be interpreted
in a variety of ways: some farmers are likely to be reluctant to install meters,
either for ideological reasons or because they mistrust promises made by the
government in return; other farmers may be more civic-minded and more
willing to install meters to help promote responsible groundwater use.
Changes in groundwater levels occur over time. To capture this variation,
it would be necessary to incorporate a full dynamic optimization model.
However, doing so would also exponentially increase the complexity of the
analysis and provide little extra intuition. This model therefore adopts a
static analysis, but ensures that data are consistent with respect to annual
versus lump sum values and the comparison of impacts realized at dierent
40
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics. 
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5
times. To do so, all lump sum payments in the model are converted into
annualized values. Conversions are made using a real interest rate of 5%.
The Bromley et al paper predicts the level of groundwater 30 years from
today. We approximate the time path of decline with a linear model and
calculate implied pumping costs for each year. We then calculate a constant
annual pumping cost that generates an equivalent net present value cost.
Farmers make their (constant) annual decisions on the basis of this cost. In
reality, water levels would decline more rapidly in early years and then slowly
level out. The linear choice is simpler and also osets the consequences of
failing to vary water extractions over time.
The full model developed in Section 4.3 can only be solved using numer-
ical solution techniques. The numerical analysis uses Matlab's Newton-
Raphson based optimization algorithms. As noted in Section 3.2, the solution
to the implementation stage is the joint solution to all farmers' Kuhn-Tucker
conditions. These conditions form a system of nonlinear inequalities, which
causes two numerical diculties. First, the system is dicult to solve.13 Sec-
ond, the solution to the inner system is inherently non-smooth at the bound-
aries of the constraint surface. As a policy instrument changes slightly, the
equilibrium may move from a region where one of the inner inequalities is
binding to one where it is not. This can create a kinked or discontinuous
response, which is problematic for numerical optimization methods.
Both problems are addressed by converting the inner constrained prob-
lem into a nearly equivalent unconstrained problem using penalty functions.
For example, instead of explicitly preventing farmers from exceeding their
current farm size, a large penalty is subtracted from the payo if farmers vi-
olate their land use constraint. The penalty function approach is frequently
used in the operations research literature (Pinar, 1996; Ç. Pinar and Zenios,
1994). Several other features of the basic model create non-smooth responses.
Each of these are addressed by approximating the non-smooth functions with
smoothed ones.
A.2 Data description
The main crops in the region are vineyards, cereals, horticultural products
(primarily melons, garlic, and onions), and corn. Small farms grow almost
13There is a substantial literature on the diculty of nding numerical solutions for com-
plex Nash equilibrium games of this form. See Krawczyk (2005); Krawczyk and Uryasev
(2000) for a review of past approaches to the problem and a numerical solution technique.
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Table 2: Net Revenue and Water Requirements of Regional Crops
Average Net Revenue Average Average Revenue
(Pre-Water Costs) Irrigation Dose per m3
Crop (C= /ha) (m3/ha) (C= /m3)
Vineyards 704 1,500 0.563
Horticultural Products 2,780 4,500 0.401
Cereals 419 2,800 0.242
Corn 1,506 7,500 0.143
Data in this table are estimates. See Appendix A.
exclusively vineyard and horticultural products, while medium farms grow
a mix of vineyards, horticultural products, and cereals. Large farms grow
very little vineyard or horticultural products, preferring cereals and corn.
Corn is a particularly water intensive crop grown exclusively on large farms.
Horticultural products are considered socially desirable as they promote em-
ployment in the region. However, they are also relatively water intensive.
Table 2 shows the average net revenue and water requirements for each of
these crops.
Observed farming patterns are drawn from Llamas and Martinez-Santos
(2005), Confederacion Hydrograca del Guadiana (2007), and Llamas et al.
(2006). Farm production functions are calibrated using positive mathemat-
ical programming (Howitt, 1995). Bromley et al. (1996, 2001) construct a
hydrological model of the Guadiana basin and project water levels under
various water use levels. They provide several data points, from which we
construct an approximate relationship between water use and groundwater
levels (Figure 6). Continuation of current water use (approx 675 Mm3) will
result in a substantial drop in water levels. Stabilizing levels requires sub-
stantial cutbacks. Stabilization is marked on the gure. There are several
model parameters for which information is limited or imprecise, including il-
legal water use and monitoring costs. However, policy discussion is currently
proceeding with information similar to that used here.
We combined information from a variety of sources to parametrize our
model. Availability of information on water use in the basin is limited. This
appendix describes our assumptions and our eorts to reconcile information
across sources.
Estimates of the total number of farms in the region varied from 20,000
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Figure 6: Projected Groundwater Depth at Various Use Levels























Table 3: Farmers with water rights
Farm Farm Representative % Farms Number Legal
size size size with of farms irrigated
category (ha) (ha) rights with rights surface
Small
0-10 (48%)
7.2 80% 5,600 40,320
10-20 (32%)
Medium 20-50 35 14% 980 34,300
Large 50-250 150 6% 420 63,000
Total 100% 7,000 137,620
Note: Total number of farms with rights = 7,000
to approximately 33,000 farms. Our analysis assumes that there are 25,000
farms. According to PEAG, there are approximately 7,000 exploitations or
legally irrigated farms in the region. Of these, 48% are between 0 and 10ha,
32% are between 10 and 20ha, 14% are between 20 and 50 ha, and 6% be-
tween 50 and 250 ha. We combined these farms into three size categories as
shown in the table below. The total irrigated acreage derived from these cal-
culations is very close to the total legal irrigated acreage reported in Llamas
and Martinez-Santos (2005).
The remaining farms in the region are assumed to have no water rights.
Subtracting the 7,000 legal farms from 25,000 total farms leaves us with
18,000 farms without legal water rights. We assumed these farms are all
small farms with the same representative size as small legal farms. This
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Table 4: Legal irrigated surface, irrigation does and water use by crop type
Crop type Legal irrigated surface (ha) Irrigation dose (m3) Water use (m3)
Winter cereals 62,000 2,800 173,600,000
Horticulture 24,000 4,500 108,000,000
Maize 9,000 7,500 67,500,000
Vineyards 45,000 1,500 67,500,000
Tot/Avg 140,000 4,075 416,600,000
gives us a total acreage of farms without rights of 7.2 ha times 18,000 farms
or approximately 129,600 ha. Adding this acreage to the total from Table 1,
we have a total irrigated acreage of approximately 267,000 ha. This number
is close to but a little higher than estimates of the total irrigated surface
(230,000ha) from remote sensing (Llamas and Martinez-Santos, 2005; Con-
federacion Hydrograca del Guadiana, 2007).
According to SIAR estimates (Llamas and Martinez-Santos, 2005), the
legal irrigated surface is distributed across crop types as shown in table 2.
According to previous studies on the production system of the basin, we
distinguish three main production regimes: small farms producing vineyards
and horticultural products, medium farms producing vineyards, horticultural
products and winter cereals, and large farms producing winter cereals and
maize.
Because maize is grown only by large farms, all 9,000 ha of maize pro-
duction occurs on large farms. This implies that approximately 14% of the
63,000 ha irrigated by large farms is devoted to maize production. We there-
fore assume that 14% of the acreage on a representative large farm (or 21
ha) is devoted to growing maize. The remaining 86% (129 ha) is devoted to
winter cereals.
All together, the large farms devote approximately 54,000 ha to the pro-
duction of cereals. This implies that the remaining 8,000 ha of cereals must
be produced by medium farms. This accounts for approximately 24% of the
total medium farm acreage. According to Tarjuelo (2007), about 30% of
the irrigated land of a medium farm is devoted to vineyards. For an indi-
vidual medium farm, this implies that approximately 10.5 ha are devoted
to vineyards. Therefore, the irrigated surface that medium farms devote to
vineyards is about 10,290 ha. Finally, the remaining 46% (16,010 ha) of
medium farm land is devoted to horticultural crop production.
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Table 5: Farm Size and Water Use
Small Farms Medium Large
w/ Rights w/o Rights Farms Farms
Number of Farms 5,600 18,000 980 420
Average Size (ha) 7.2 7.2 15 150
% of Area 16 52 6 25
% of Water Use 12 40 16 32
% of Water Rights 20 0 27 53
Avg. Legal Use Per Farm (thous. m3) 13.5 0 100 467
Avg. Illegal Use Per Farm (thous. m3) 1.5 15 11.2 51.9
Small farms with legal rights produce vineyards and horticultural prod-
ucts. Since the total irrigated surface devoted to horticulture is 24,000 ha
and medium farms devote 16,010 ha to horticulture, small farms must devote
7990 ha to horticulture. Using similar logic, small farms devote 34,710 ha to
vineyards. This corresponds to approximately 1.4 ha of horticulture and 5.8
ha of vines for our representative small farms.
We assume that the small farms without water rights are similar in struc-
ture and crop choice to those with rights. This implies an additional 25,200
ha of horticulture using approximately 113.4 Mm3 of water and 104,400 ha
of vines using approximately 156.6 Mm3 of water. All together, total water
use on farms with no rights totals approximately 270 Mm3. From Table 4,
water use on farms with rights totals approximately 417 Mm3, generating
total water use in the region of approximately 687 Mm3, which is close to the
CHG estimates of the water use in agriculture within the region (685 Mm3).
We have very little direct information on the allocation of precise water rights
among the farms with rights. The analysis in this paper was performed as-
suming that 10% of the water used by a representative farm with rights is
in excess of the authorized amount, regardless of farm size. Combined, this
information produces the distribution of land and water use by farm type
shown in Table 5. It demonstrates that large farms control a disproportion-
ate amount of the water rights and produce more water intensive crops than
their smaller neighbors.
Data on crop returns vary widely. Table 8 reports values averaged from
several sources (CHG, FAO-Stat, Juan et al. 1999). These values were used
to calibrate production functions using the technique described in Howitt
(1995).
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Table 6: Crop Returns
Irrigated Irrigated
Horticulture Corn Cereals Vines
Quantity (kg/ha) 35000 10760 3500 7600
Price (C= /kg) 0.122 0.16 0.18 0.19
Gross return (C= /ha) 4270 1722 630 1444
Water costs (C= /ha) 315 525 196 105
Non-water costs (C= /ha) 2380 975 215 490
Amortization (C= /ha) 85 6 8 109
Total costs (C= /ha) 2780 1506 419 704
Net return (C= /ha) 1490 216 211 740
Subsidies (C= /ha) 0 330 270 0
Net return with subsidies (C= /ha) 1,490 546 481 740
Assumes a water cost of 0.07C= /m3.
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